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  Prescribed fire is a useful but risky method for reducing general wildfire risk and 
improving wildlife habitat, biodiversity, timber growth, and agricultural forage. In the past the 
fifteen years, laws is some states have been adopted to support the use of prescribed fire. This 
article examines the effect of liability law and common regulations on the incidence and severity 
of escaped prescribed fires in the United States from 1970 to 2002. Regression results show that 
stringent statutory liability law and regulation tends to reduce the number and severity of escaped 
prescribed fires on private land, but not on federal land where state liability law does not directly 
apply. 
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Aboriginal Americans used ﬁre extensively to cultivate native grasses, to modify forest vege-
tation, and to facilitate hunting. This cultural use in conjunction with the natural occurrence
of ﬁre was an important determinant of the ecological landscapes that existed during Eu-
ropean colonization of North America (Kimmerer and Lake 2001, Pyne 1982 1991). In the
early twentieth century, the U.S. federal land management agencies other related institutions
shifted emphasis away from active prescribed ﬁre use to focus virtually exclusively on ﬁre
suppression, a shift in management symbolized by the creation of Smokey the Bear in the
mid 1940s(Carle 2002, Pyne 1982).1 As a result of these suppression eﬀorts, the structure
of forests and prairies has changed. In recent decades it has become increasingly evident to
ﬁre researchers and land managers that these changes have produced vegetation structures
more conducive to large, hard to control catastrophic ﬁres (Carle 2002, Babbitt 1995, Cooper
1960).2 Furthermore, empirical research increasingly suggests that ﬁre holds unique capa-
bilities for improving biodiversity and agricultural productivity. (Carle 2002, Zimmerman
1997, Briggs and Knapp 1995, Babbitt 1995, Cooper 1960).
So, after a century of emphasis on wildﬁre suppression, there is a resurgence of interest in
using prescribed ﬁre as a management tool in many parts of the United States. The Federal
government now formally recognizes prescribed ﬁre as an integral element of wildﬁre man-
agement on federal lands (U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture
1995). Cleaves et al. (2000) report that the number of national forests using prescribed ﬁre
increased by 76% between 1985 and 1994. About 900,000 acres of Federal land was treated
with prescribed ﬁre in 1995, and the annual acreage treated had increased to 2.2 million
by 1999 (National Interagency Fire Center 2001). The Healthy Forests Restoration Act of
2003 includes substantial emphasis on fuels management to address forest health and wildﬁre
concerns. In principle, the Act calls for increases in the use of prescribed ﬁre and mechanical
thinning to reduce fuel loads, and it dictates that these eﬀorts should concentrate primarily
on the wildland urban interface.
1Prescribed ﬁre is nonetheless a risky management tool, and this resurgence of interest is
accompanied by renewed legislative attention and regulation in many states. For example, in
the last 15 years many southeastern states have enacted legislation that explicitly recognizes
that careful application of prescribed ﬁre provides public beneﬁts. These statutes tend to
clarify liability standards relative to common law and their statutory precursors, in some
cases they reduce the burden liability for burners substantially, while simultaneously insti-
tute more stringent regulations over prescribed ﬁre use. In Florida and Georgia for example,
certiﬁed burner managers now who satisfy more stringent and detailed preparation docu-
mentation requirements face only a gross negligence standard rather than simple negligence
or strict liability in the event of an escape.
Because of the potentially high costs of escaped prescribed ﬁre, legal liability is often
cited as a major concern by people using prescribed ﬁre as a land management tool, and
it is among the most often cited reasons for not using prescribed ﬁre (Brenner and Wade
2003, Hesseln 2000, Haines and Cleaves 1999). Law and regulation aﬀects the incentives of
individuals for taking risks and for exerting precaution in the process (Roe 2004, Kolstad
et al. 1990, Brown 1973, among many others). Thus, as is the case with many human
activities (Shogren and Crocker 1999), the likelihood of escape and the scale of subsequent
property damage is endogenous; a consequence of the behavior of prescribed burners and
their neighbors, which in turn is aﬀected by the institutional environment in which they
operate.
This article examines the eﬀect of liability law and common regulations on the incidence
and severity of escaped prescribed ﬁre. The analysis is based on data from 1970 to 2002 from
the National Interagency Fire Management Information Database (NIFMID), in conjunction
with a categorization of state statutory law. The regressions analyses control for various
factors that aﬀect baseline risk and incentives for precaution, such as land values, population
demographics, the overall incidence of wildﬁres, and other factors. Results show that the
incidence of escaped prescribed ﬁres originating from private landowners or their agents tends
2to be lower in states with more stringent statutory liability law and regulatory restrictions.
Public employees using prescribed ﬁre on federal land face federal law that does not vary
across states, and the results suggest that this group of prescribed burners are not responsive
to variation in state law in the same way that private land managers are.
A theoretical foundation and testable hypotheses are developed in the next section to
support the empirical analysis. The data are described in section 3, estimation methods
are outlined in section 4, results and interpretation are presented in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theory
Consider a set of heterogenous landowners, each of which stand to gain beneﬁts from pre-
scribed ﬁre, but also face costs and risks associated with its use. Assume the ex ante net
expected value of a prescribed ﬁre for any given landowner is
v = b − ρd(x,z)ε − wx, (1)
where b ∼ (¯ b,ς2) ∈ [0,∞] represent beneﬁts from a prescribed ﬁre that are randomly
distributed across land parcels but known ex ante, ρ ≥ 0 is an index that represents the
relative stringency of liability law across states.3 The function d(x,z) represents expected
damage from an escaped prescribed ﬁre, and depends on endogenous precaution x and en-
vironmental characteristics z. The random disturbance ε is distributed (1,σ2) ∈ [0,∞] so
that d(x,z) is ex ante expected damage and also (aymptotically) ex post mean damage. The
marginal cost of precaution is w.
The stringency index ρ is a stylized representation of the eﬀects of liability rules on the
risks faced by prescribed burners. Three fundamental forms of liability are examined in
the empirical analysis: strict liability, simple negligence, and gross negligence. Consider
the relative eﬀects of each of these on the expected costs on the burner in a very simple
3setting with no evidentiary or judicial uncertainty. Given strict liability, the burner always
pays damages regardless of precautionary eﬀort, and damage given an escape may be high
because potential victims (who will be compensated in the event of property damage) have
little or no incentive for self protection. Under a simple negligence rule with an eﬃciently
set standard, the burner will expend just enough eﬀort to satisfy the standard, and therefore
will not pay damages (Brown 1973). Under gross negligence, the standard is set lower than
under simple negligence. The burner will again choose to satisfy the standard, but will need
to exert less eﬀort to do so than under simple negligence. Thus, for these three general forms
of liability, the relative ranking from least to most stringent would be a) gross negligence,
b) simple negligence, c) strict liability; the stylized index ρ as deﬁned would be increasing
in that order. The treatment of ρ in equation 1 is does not perfectly mirror the sources of
stringency, but it is a suﬃcient and convenient heuristic for deriving comparative statics. 4
In addition to civil liability, some states have codiﬁed criminal liability law. These
statutes generally state that if an individual is found to have performed a prescribed ﬁre
in a negligent fashion, the individual faces not only civil liability, but criminal liability as
well. Such a statutory rule presumably increases the expected costs of negligence beyond
that of civil liability alone. Thus, for a given civil liability rule, a criminal negligence law
would be associated with a higher ρ.
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for maximizing the expected value of equation 1 are
dx < 0 and dxx < 0 (subscripts denote ﬁrst and second derivatives). Given that prescribed
burners maximize the expected value v of a burn by choosing x∗ = x(ρ,z,w) that satisﬁes





where, again, subscripts denote ﬁrst and second derivatives. This comparative statics result
will support a number of hypotheses to be developed in the next section and then tested
4empirically.
First, based on the Envelope Theorem, the eﬀect of a change in ρ on the expected net
beneﬁts of prescribed ﬁre is
∂v(ρ,z,w)
∂ρ
= −d(ρ,z,w) < 0,
Given that b varies across landholdings but is known ex ante, some individuals with small but
positive net beneﬁts under one legal regime will chose not to burn under a diﬀerent regime
with higher ρ. Suppose the fraction of land parcels for which v > 0 is 1 − F(v(¯ b,ρ,z,w)),
where F(·) has the characteristics of a cumulative density function and accounts for both
sources of random variation (b and ε). The total number of prescribed ﬁres is
n(N,¯ b,ρ,z,w) = N[1 − F(v(·))],
and total expected aggregate damage is
D(N,¯ b,ρ,z) = n(N,ρ,¯ b,z)d(ρ,z,w).5
It is useful now to divide expected damage into to parts. Let d = δ(x,z,w)π(x,z,w),
where δ(·) is expected property damage (or average damage) per ﬁre given an escape and
π(·) is the probability of escape (or the proportion of prescribed ﬁres that escape).6 The
division of d into potential damage and the probability of escape means that the expected
number of escaped prescribed ﬁres can be deﬁned as n(·)π(·). Based on the above model,
5the eﬀect of increased stringency on aggregate number of ﬁres and escaped ﬁres are:
∂nπ
∂ρ
= nπxxρ − fNδπ
2 < 0, (2a)
∂δ
∂ρ
= δxxρ < 0, (2b)
∂D
∂ρ
= −[nxρ(w/ρ) + fN(πδ)
2] < 0, (2c)
where f is the probability density function associated with F. These comparatives statics
results imply the following hypotheses that are testable with the available data:
Hypothesis 1. Fewer prescribed ﬁres will escape under more stringent liability rules (2a).
Hypothesis 2. Damage per escape will be lower under more stringent liability rules (2b).
Hypothesis 3. Aggregate damage from escaped prescribed ﬁres will be lower under more
stringent liability rules (2c).
In addition to tests about the eﬀects of civil and criminal liability rules, the eﬀects of
direct regulation will be examined. Regulatory permit systems that restrict the number and
timing of prescribed ﬁres in order to limit risks will tend to lead to fewer escaped prescribed
ﬁres and fewer acres of wildﬁres originating as prescribed ﬁres. Burn ban statutes allow
states and counties within states to restrict the use of prescribed ﬁres during certain times
of year and/or certain conditions.
Unlike private individuals, federal employees carrying out their duties on federal land do
not directly face state liability and criminal laws. Rather, they face liability under the federal
Tort Claims Act.7 Therefore, strictly speaking, variations in state liability law should not
lead to signiﬁcant variations in the incidence and severity of escaped prescribed ﬁres started
by federal employees and originating on federal land. This unique setting provides a basis
for another testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. State liability law will have little or no systematic eﬀect on the number and
severity of escaped prescribed ﬁres started by public employees on federal land.
6One exception to the diﬀerence between federal employees and state law is that federal
employees planning prescribed ﬁres generally apply for prescribed ﬁre permits if a state
requires them, and they generally abide by state burn bans when they are imposed. There-
fore, although liability law ought not in principle have an eﬀect on the behavior of federal
employees on federal land, direct state regulatory restrictions may have more of an eﬀect.8
A number of southeastern states have implemented “certiﬁed burner laws, ” or “Pre-
scribed Burn Manager” laws (PBMLs). These laws outline a relatively detailed set of rules
and guidelines. If a prescribed burner is certiﬁed through a state sanctioned prescribed burn-
ing certiﬁcation process and a speciﬁc prescribed ﬁre plan and implementation satisﬁed the
rules laid out in the statutes, the burner is provided more protection than otherwise (Brenner
and Wade 1992). In a couple of cases such as Florida and Georgia, a certiﬁed burner who
satisﬁes the statutory requirements must be found grossly negligent in order to be held liable
for damage from an escaped prescribed ﬁre. The eﬀect of this combination of direct regula-
tion and a gross negligence rule is an interesting one. On the one hand, stricter requirements
presumably mean that fewer prescribed ﬁres will escape and the number of severe escapes
will decrease if the requirements are eﬀective. On the other hand, holding regulations con-
stant, a gross negligence rule will tend to reduce the level of precaution required to satisfy
the liability rule, which in turn reduces the costs of prescribed ﬁre and should increase the
incidence of escape. Holding PBMLs constant, gross negligence rules should induce more,
and more severe, escaped prescribed ﬁres than other states. To summarize:
Hypothesis 5. States with strict PBMLs will tend to have lower incidence and severity of
prescribed ﬁres.
Hypothesis 6. States with gross negligence rules will tend to have more, and more severe,
escaped prescribed ﬁres.
Other nonlegal factors also aﬀect the use of prescribed ﬁre and precaution during use.
These are factors that aﬀect the size of the beneﬁts, b, elements in z that aﬀect the size
7of expected damage from escape d, and the costs of prescribed ﬁre precaution w. For our
purposes, these amount to factors that should be accounted for in regressions to reduce bias
in estimation of the legal parameters of interest. For example, prescribed ﬁre will tend to
be used less, and precaution will be higher when potential damage from escape is large.
The proxy variables used in the regressions to represent these factors will be discussed in
sections 3 and 5, but an example of an element of z that is important to control for is the
overall propensity for wildﬁres and wildﬁre severity in a region. This factor is accounted for
by including explanatory variables representing the characteristics of wildﬁre that were not
started as prescribed ﬁres.
3 Data
The data used in this analysis come from a number of sources. The data on ﬁre characteristics
is from the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC). Variables representing state-level law
and regulation were constructed from state statutes and veriﬁed through cross-referencing
with other published sources as well as telephone conversations with agency employees.
Descriptions and summary statistics of variables used in the estimation are presented in
table 2 on page 33. The following subsections describe the data in more detail.
State law. Table 1 provide summaries of state statutory law. Most states with statutory
law relating to prescribed ﬁre explicitly specify a negligence rule. In the absence of statu-
tory law, state-level common law forms the basis for court decisions about prescribed ﬁre
liability, and common law tends to be predicated on negligence rules (American Law Reports
Editorial Staﬀ 1994). Four states, however, impose strict liability on prescribed burners —
Connecticut, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. If a ﬁre escapes, the burner is
liable for damage regardless of his or her eﬀort to contain the ﬁre. There are a great many
subtle diﬀerences in statutory liability law for prescribed ﬁre across states, but we focus only
on the two fundamental forms, strict liability and negligence rules.
8[Table 1 about here.]
Permits and ﬁre bans can be interpreted as a regulatory attempt at reducing the number
of high risk prescribed ﬁres. From an economic perspective, the potential of facing criminal
penalties for negligence will tend to increase the perceived costs of negligence, and so will have
the eﬀect of reducing accidental escape by increasing incentives for investing in precautionary
eﬀort. It turns out that there is a near one-to-one match between the states with statutes
that support permits and states with statutes that support burn bans — the two have
historically been implemented at the same time. Therefore, it is not possible to separate the
eﬀects of these two regulatory factors in this analysis. Any discussion below of the eﬀects of
burn bans or of permit systems should be interpreted as the eﬀects of either one, the other,
or both.
The potential eﬀect of Prescribed Burn Manager (PBM) laws are more complex. These
laws tend to reduce the stringency of liability that prescribed burn managers face, but only if
they satisfy a relatively strict set of guidelines. In two cases, Florida and Georgia, PBMs are
now liable only if found grossly negligent as long as an explicit set of regulatory conditions
are met.
Fire data. The National Interagency Fire Management Integrated Database (NIFMID)
includes approximately 380,000 observations on individual ﬁres from 1970 through 2002 for
all states except Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, or Rhode
Island (NIFMID 2004a). The states missing from NIFMID are not states with substantial
wildﬁre activity, but this set includes one of the four states that have strict liability laws —
one of the legal parameters of interest for this analysis.9 The data descriptions that follow
rely on the NIFMID technical guide NIFMID (2004b). In addition to an incomplete set of
states, there is almost complete lack of data on escaped debris ﬁres (and other categories of
human cause ﬁres) for the years 1986 through 1995. Data on resource damage estimates are
also missing for those years. Therefore, all analysis is based on the years 1970 – 1985 and
91996 – 2002. Donoghue (1982) provides a discussion of the history and reliability of wildﬁre
reporting.
[Table 2 about here.]
Sample selection. The estimation approach is to select two separate samples of escaped
prescribed ﬁre observations from the NIFMID database: one including ﬁres originating from
private land and one including ﬁres originating from federal land. The sample is then aggre-
gated to the state/year level because laws are state level explanatory variables. Regressions
of interest are then estimated based on the aggregated data.10
A debris ﬁre is assumed to have been started by a private landowner or his or her agent
if it was started on “State and private lands inside National Forest Boundary” and “out-
side National Forest boundary”, and if the igniter was “local permanent” and an “owner”,
“permittee”, or “contractor”.11 A debris ﬁre is assumed to have been started by a public
employee on federal land if it was started on “National Forest” or “other Federal Land inside
NF boundary” and by a “public employee” or “local permanent”.12 Although not perfect
categorizations, these deﬁnitions ﬁt as closely as possible given the data deﬁnitions.
The NIFMID data relate to wildﬁres. For a wildﬁre started as a prescribed ﬁre, the
acreage and damage included in the dataset pertain to the wildﬁre acreage and damage that
occurred outside the prescription. The acreage originally in the prescription is not included.
That is, all observations used in this analysis pertain to wildﬁres. The central focus of the
analysis are characteristics of wildﬁres that happened to be started as prescribed ﬁres.
There are a number of weaknesses associated with the NIFMID data. It does not provide
information on the number of prescribed ﬁres started or the fraction that escape. Individual
wildﬁre response team managers ﬁll out a standardized form (USDA Froest service form
FSH 5109.14), and the deﬁnitions of the data requested are in some cases not deﬁned very
clearly. Furthermore, the requested data are in some cases omitted. To the extent that data
omissions or misinterpretations aﬀect independent variables, or are otherwise systematic,
10bias might be introduced into the regression estimates.
Dependent variables. For a given state, year, the dependent variables used in the re-
gression analysis are: 1) the number of escaped prescribed ﬁres, 2) the estimated damage
plus suppression costs incurred in total and per ﬁre, 3) the total and average size, in acres,
of escaped prescribed ﬁres. Note that these dependent variables correspond exactly to the
testable hypotheses 1 through 3, and can be used to test the hypotheses 4 and 6 as well.
The number of escaped prescribed ﬁres occurring in a given state and year represents the
number of escapes, and the latter two dependent variables, damage plus suppression costs
and acreage, are proxies for the extent of damage given that a ﬁre escapes. The sum of the
estimated resource damage plus suppression costs is used to represent the costs of escapes,
because the two are in a sense endogenously determined, depending on the suppression
expenditures of the ﬁre-ﬁghting agency, such that if suppression expenditures increases for
a given ﬁre, damage is lower than it would be. Therefore, using one or the other is an
incomplete measure.13
Explanatory variables Other factors aﬀect prescribed burners’ incentives for precaution
and the risks of escape. The variables described below are used to control for non-legal
factors aﬀecting expected costs and risks associated with prescribed ﬁre use.
The general propensity for wildﬁres is dependent on the characteristics of the vegetation
and environment in which the prescribed ﬁres occur, and will have an important eﬀect on
both the usefulness of prescribed ﬁre and the risks associated with using it. Therefore, the
incidence and severity of wildﬁres from other causes can be used to control for the general
propensity for wildﬁres in a state and year. The empirical distributions of the number, total
resource damage and average suppression cost plus damage are shown in ﬁgures 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The value of rural land is dependent largely on the value of the productivity of land. The
11crops, timber, forage, and other vegetative output represent, in this case, potential damage
from an escaped prescribed ﬁre. Therefore, land value, Land value ($1000s per acre, deﬂated
by the national CPI) is being used as one proxy for potential damage from escaped prescribed
ﬁre (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2003). Average farm size (in acres) is available from
the Agricultural Statistics Database (U.S. Census of Agriculture 2004).14
Land cover type aﬀects the propensity for prescribed ﬁre use as well as wildﬁre risk and
severity. State grass acreage is is the sum of the acreage of “Pastureland” and “Rangeland”,
and State forest acreage is the variable “Forest Land”. Median patch size is estimated median
diameter in feet of wildlife habitat patches (it is right-censored at 1000 feet), and proxies for
vegetation fragmentation (National Resources Inventory 1997a). These data are from NRI
Table 2 - Land cover/use of nonfederal rural land, by state and year (data per 1,000 acres)
(National Resources Inventory 1997b). The data span 1982 to 1997, with observations every
ﬁve years. Data were interpolated linearly within between data points for annual estimates,
and were set to the 1982 and 1997 values for years before and after, respectively.
Human population density, Population density is also being used as a proxy for potential
damage, because higher human populations are associated with more residential and business
structures and more health risks from escaped ﬁre. Increases in either of these variables are
hypothesized to reduce the number and total acreage of escaped prescribed ﬁres. Population
estimates for 1970 to 2002 were compiled based on US Census Bureau intercensal data tables
(U.S. Census Bureau 2001 2004). Population density was estimated by dividing population
for each year by the total land area of the state as reported in National Resources Inventory
(1997b).
4 Estimation
As outlined before, regression functions are estimated for three types of dependent variables:
1) the number of escaped prescribed ﬁres, 2) the total size and damage of escaped ﬁres, and
123) the average size and damage of escaped prescribed ﬁres. The distributional characteristics
of these dependent variables calls for a diﬀerent estimation method in each case.
The number of escaped prescribed ﬁres is count data, and data such as these are often
represented by and estimated with Poisson distributions and Poisson regressions. Likelihood
ratio tests show however that overdispersion is apparent in each case, so Negative Binomial
regressions are applied instead (Greene 2003, pp. 740-744).15 Estimated elasticities for the
Negative Binomial regression based on an exponential mean function are

nb
i = (yi/xi)β exp[x
0
iβ].
Total damage and acreage. When no escaped prescribed ﬁres are recorded for a given
state and year in the sample, the total size and damage of escaped prescribed ﬁres is zero, and
many observations on ﬁre acreage and damage have values of zero. Therefore, a Tobit regres-
sion is applied to account for censoring of the dependent variable. All non-binary variables
are transformed to natural logs before prior to estimation because the estimated disturbances
in preliminary regressions appeared approximately log-normal for the non-censored observa-
tions. Therefore, the estimated elasticities for an observation i of a non-binary variable in










Using the transformation for dummy variables in logarithmic equations developed by
Kennedy (1981), the percent diﬀerence corresponding to one dummy variable dj ∈ D under
normally distributed disturbances are
∆E[ln(yi)|xi,Di]
∆dj







where by deﬁnition ∆dj is 1 or -1, and vj is the variance of βj. The estimate of this eﬀect is
calculated by replacing the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates.16
13Log transformations cannot be performed when a variable takes the value of zero (the
natural log of zero is −∞). This case is common, particularly for the dependent variable.
Therefore, values of zero were changed to 0.0001 prior to taking the logarithm. The lower
bound for the dependent variable in the Tobit model as estimated is therefore ln(0.0001) ≈
−9.21.
Average damage and acreage per ﬁre. For the observations in which the total acreage
and damage are zero, the average acreage and damage is undeﬁned and therefore missing.
The same factors that aﬀect the average escaped prescribed ﬁre size (given tat least one
escaped prescribed ﬁre) also is likely to aﬀect whether the observation is missing. Ignoring
this sample selection process can result in biased parameter estimates. Therefore, a Heckman
model for sample selection is estimated when average acreage or damage is the dependent
variable. If a test for sample selectivity does not indicate sample selection, ordinary least
squares estimates are reported instead.
The estimated elasticity vector from a Heckman sample selection model with non-binary
variables in natural log form is
∂E[ln(yi)|in sample]
∂ ln(xi)
= β − γβλδi(w
0
iγ)
where x and β is the matrix of explanatory variables and vector of parameters in the second
stage regression of interest, and w and γ are the variables and parameters in the selection
equation, and δi = λi(λi − w0
iγ) where λi = φ(w0
iγ)/Φ(w0
iγ) is the inverse Mills ratio
evaluated at observation i. Although not explicit in the notation above, non-binary variables
in w are in natural logs. For the percent change due to dummy variables, the Kennedy (1981)
transformation is applied as in equation 3.
In these regressions on average wildﬁre and damage, the observations represents an aver-
age based over the number of escaped debris ﬁres. Thus, the variance of the sample averages
will diminish with the number of ﬁres in a given state and year. This fact is accounted for in
14regressions by performing weighted maximum likelihood estimation, where the weights are
deﬁned as 1/
√
ni, where ni is the number of observations used to generate the averages for
regression observation i in the aggregated dataset.
All estimation and graph generation was performed using the statistical software [Inter-
cooled] Stata version 8.2.
5 Results
Table 3 presents regression results for two sets of regressions. The ﬁrst set correspond to
debris ﬁres that were started on private land, and the second set correspond to debris ﬁres
started on Federal land by public employees. The dependent variables for each set are:
• The number of escaped prescribed ﬁres (# ﬁres),
• Total resource damage and suppression costs of escaped ﬁres (tot.d+s),
• Total acreage of escaped debris ﬁres (tot.ac.),
• Average resource damage and suppression costs (avg.d+s)
• Average acreage of escaped ﬁres (avg.ac).
The estimates shown correspond to elasticities for continuous variables and the percent
diﬀerences for binary explanatory variables.
The ﬁrst ﬁve rows of variables in the regressions in table 3 are the dummy variables
representing state prescribed ﬁre law and regulation. Each takes the value one if the law
described by the name and label in table 2 is in eﬀect for that state and year. The rest
of the variables other than the constant are proxies for state characteristics that aﬀect the
risks associated with prescribed ﬁre. The ﬁnal six rows in the regressions provide selected
regression summary statistics. The base case is a state with a negligence liability rule, no
criminal penalties for negligent burning, no permit requirements, and no prescribed burner
laws (that is, all legal dummy variables equal zero).
15[Table 3 about here.]
5.1 Liability and regulation
All else constant, the signs on the ﬁrst four of these legal/regulatory variables are hypoth-
esized to be negative for each private-land regression because each is in theory designed to
limit the number and/or severity of escaped prescribed ﬁres. In contrast, PBM gross neg-
ligence reduces liability for certiﬁed prescribed burners if certain requirements are met by
the burner. Holding other laws constant, PBM gross negligence is hypothesized to reduce
the expected costs of prescribed ﬁre for burners, reduce the level of necessary precaution to
satisfy gross negligence, and so should have a positive sign.
Private land. States and years with strict liability laws (for which the variable Strict liabil-
ity equals one), tend to have fewer escaped prescribed ﬁres. Based on the # ﬁres regression
estimated percent diﬀerence of -12 percent (corresponding to the parameter estimate of -
0.12), strict liability states tend to have 1.98 fewer escaped prescribed ﬁres per year than do
comparable states with negligence rules based on sample means. Based on sample medians,
strict liability states tend to have 5.97 fewer escaped prescribed ﬁres per year.
Based on the ln(tot.d+s) and ln(tot.ac) regressions, strict liability appears to have a
substantial eﬀect on the total damage and acreage of escapes per year — an estimated
reduction of over 90 percent in each case (corresponding to parameter estimates of -0.92 and
-0.97, respectively). The marginal eﬀect of strict liability on the unconditional expected value
of d+s evaluated at the sample means is $-33,035 per year; at sample medians, the eﬀect is
about $-93 per year. The ln(tot.ac.) regression indicates that states with strict liability laws
have have an unconditional expected value of 140.0 fewer burned acres per year from escaped
prescribed ﬁre based on sample means, and 6.0 fewer acres based on sample medians. Based
on the ln(avg. d+s.) and ln(avg. ac.) regressions, individual escapes leads to an estimated
average of $5,577 reduction in d+s and escapes an average of 7.9 acres smaller per ﬁre; or
16$449 and 1.9 acre reduction per ﬁre respectively based on sample medians.
The estimated eﬀects of Permits / burn bans are negative in all private land regressions,
although not signiﬁcantly so in the ln(tot. d+s) regression. Evaluated at the sample means,
states with burn bans and/or permits have on average 1.2 fewer escaped prescribed ﬁres,
$27,513 less d+s, and 26.7 fewer acres burned from escaped ﬁres. Average wildﬁre area from
escaped prescribed ﬁres is 2.4 acres smaller.
Criminal penalties represents states with laws that impose criminal penalties for negligent
prescribed burning. The elasticity estimates for the private land regressions are negative and
signiﬁcant for two of ﬁve regressions, and positive but insigniﬁcantly so for two regressions.
Private individuals seem to react less to criminal penalties in comparison to civil liability
and permit/burn bans.
The parameter estimates for prescribed burn manager laws PBM law and PBM gross
negligence are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in most of the private land regressions.
Furthermore, in two cases, the PBM gross negligence parameters are signiﬁcant but negative,
which is counter to hypothesis 6. It is important to note however, that these laws pertain
to a smaller set of southeastern states in relatively recent years, and apply only to a smaller
subset of potential burners. It is therefore perhaps not too surprising that they show weak
eﬀects. This set of laws will be revisited below with regressions based on a more focused
subset of data.
Public employees on federal land. State law often does not, strictly speaking, apply to
federal employees. Therefore, no discernable relationship is expected between state liability
law and the incidence and extent of escaped prescribed ﬁres from federal land. The results
presented in table 3 for public employees on federal land are strikingly diﬀerent from those for
private land. In general, either the legal parameter estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero and/or they have an unexpected sign. The only exception is the set of parameters
associated with criminal penalties, which are all negative and in three cases signiﬁcantly so.
17The results for this explanatory variable notwithstanding, the eﬀects of state liability law
and regulation appear to have a very diﬀerent, and weaker eﬀect on federal employees than
on private individuals, as expected.
[Table 4 about here.]
Because a vast majority of federal land resides in western states, separate regressions were
run for western states only, US forest service regions 1 through 6. The top rows of table 4
provides a synopsis of the results pertaining to legal variables. Because no Prescribed burn
manager laws nor gross negligence laws apply to western states, these two variables were
omitted from the regressions.17
The results are similar to the regressions in table 3, except that permits/burn bans and
criminal penalties have stronger and more consistently negative estimated eﬀects on the
number and size of escapes. Based on this more focused sample, public employees on fed-
eral land appear to be responding to state criminal law and state permit and burn ban
requirements, but, as noted before, not state civil liability law. These results are generally
consistent with hypothesis 4.
Private contractors on private land To date, all of the new generation of prescribed ﬁre
statutes pertaining to prescribed burn managers are located in western states (see table 1.
Furthermore, the regressions presented in table 3 for PBM law and PBM gross negligence
show weak or counterintuitive results. Therefore, a more focused sample is used to reexamine
these eﬀects. A sample was constructed that represents only escaped prescribed ﬁres that
were started on private land by contractors in southern states, deﬁned as those states in
US Forest Service region 8. A summary of the legal parameters for these regressions are
presented in the second half of table 4.
Based on hypotheses 5 and 6, we expect PBM law to have a negative sign, because these
laws tend to impose substantial requirements for preparation and precaution. PBM gross
negligence should have a positive sign to the extent that weakening liability law reduces
18expected costs or performing a prescribed ﬁre and reduces the level of precaution necessary
to satisfy the negligence standard.
For both variables, the results provide stronger support for hypotheses 5 and 6 than the
larger samples. The coeﬃcients on PBM law are negative in all cases and signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level or above in four of the ﬁve cases. The coeﬃcients on PBM gross negligence
are positive in all but one case, but signiﬁcant (and positive) in only one. Even though
contractors need not necessarily be certiﬁed and thus are not necessarily covered by these
laws, the eﬀects of these laws seem to be reﬂected in the more narrowly focused sample.18
5.2 Other factors
The ﬁve rows in table 3 directly below the elasticity estimates for the legal variables are
variables that attempt to control for the general propensity for wildﬁre occurrence and
severity. They are diﬀerent for each regression. The number of other (non-prescribed) ﬁres
is included in the #d.ﬁres regression, the total acreage of non-prescribed wildﬁres in the
ln(tot.d+s) regression, etc. In each regression, the corresponding variable is positive and
signiﬁcant. Notably, each of these elasticity parameter estimates are less than one as well
— a one percent increase in the propensity for wildﬁre (as measured by each variable) leads
to less than a one percent increase in the propensity for escaped prescribed ﬁre. One would
hope that prescribed burners choose to respond to higher risk by increasing precaution in
terms of timing and eﬀort so that even when burning in a ﬁre prone environment (where
incidentally the beneﬁts of prescribed ﬁre are likely to be higher), a smaller percentage of
ﬁre escape and those that do inﬂict less damage.
Total state land is the total acreage of the state (in thousands of acres). All else constant,
more land supports more ﬁres. The elasticity estimates are positive as expected for private
land, strongly signiﬁcant, and in some cases surprisingly large. This could be related to the
fact that the smallest states are also in the Northeast, where among the fewest ﬁres occur.
Federal land acreage is the amount of federal land in a state (in thousands of acres).
19Holding total state acreage constant, more federal land implies less private land and vice
versa, and therefore fewer escaped private prescribed ﬁres but more escapes from federal land.
As expected, the estimated elasticities for private land are all negative and signiﬁcant. In
contrast, all but one of the estimated elasticities are positive for the federal land regressions,
again as expected. There is no clear theoretical basis for including Total state land or Federal
land acreage and in the average acreage and damage equations, so they are included only in
the selection equation of the Heckman sample selection model.
Land value represents the average value per acre of rural private land. To the extent that
land value is a proxy for values at risk, a negative sign on the coeﬃcient is expected, because
higher values at risk mean higher potential damage, more endogenous precautionary eﬀort,
and therefore ultimately higher expected costs of prescribed ﬁre. The estimated eﬀects are
mixed however, and weak for federal land. Two factors that might confound the results are
that if wildﬁre risk mitigation is the primary beneﬁt of prescribed ﬁre, prescribed ﬁre might
be applied more often where land values are high.
Population density represents the average human population density. Like Land value,
this variable is included as a proxy for potential damage, so a higher population density
represents higher potential damage, with a negative expected sign. The sign is negative and
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better in eight of ten cases, insigniﬁcant in the other
two cases.
Average farm size (in acres) is a proxy for land ownership fragmentation. Small plots
will tend to increase the cost of prescribed ﬁres. On the other hand, if marginal precaution
costs tend to be lower per ﬁre, then more precaution ought to be exerted per ﬁre. Therefore,
the sign could be either positive or negative. The elasticity is positive in the ﬁrst private
land regression (number of escapes) but negative and strongly signiﬁcant in the others. The
latter negative coeﬃcients could in fact be because even if a ﬁre escapes, where farm sizes
are small there are likely to be more ﬁre breaks such as roads, etc. The federal land elasticity
estimates are also negative in four of ﬁve cases (signiﬁcant in three). Although private land
20ownership acreage will directly aﬀect federal land ﬁres that move onto private land, there is
likely to be some correlation between the average size of contiguous federal land holding and
the size of rural private landholdings.
State forest acreage and State grass acreage are estimates of the number of acres (in 1000s)
of forest land and grassland, respectively (as deﬁned in section 3), and are included as proxies
to control for the extent of predominant vegetation types in the state. If prescribed ﬁre is
used mostly to manage non-crop forest or pasture vegetation, then the elasticity estimates
on the number of escapes and total acreage and damage should increase. The estimated
signs and signiﬁcance on both of these are mixed. The only consistent pattern is that state
forest acreage has a positive and signiﬁcant impact in all federal land regressions. There is
no clear theoretical basis for including these variables in the average acreage and damage
equations, so they are omitted except in the Heckman selection equation.
Median patch size is a proxy for vegetation fragmentation. If “patchiness” as deﬁned for
this variable tends to be associated with more (or more eﬀective) natural or man-made fuel
breaks, one might expect that fewer ﬁres would get out of control, or would be smaller in
magnitude if they did. The sign of the estimates are mixed.
The 1970-1985 dummy takes the value 1 if year < 1986 and zero if year > 1995 (as
discussed above, intervening years are left out of the analysis due to missing data). The
parameter estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant from zero for four of ﬁve private land
regressions, suggesting that there is little substantive diﬀerence between the number or
extent of escaped debris ﬁres early in the sample as compared to late on private land.
It is interesting to note, however, that the estimates for federal land are all positive and
strongly signiﬁcant. this is consistent with the fact that prescribed ﬁre use on federal lands
has increased substantially since 1995 (U.S. Department of Interior et al. 2001).
216 Conclusion
Prescribed ﬁre is increasingly viewed as an eﬀective tool for wildﬁre risk mitigation and
vegetation management for biodiversity, game habitat, as well as for timber and agricultural
forage production. Nonetheless, the use of prescribed ﬁre is risky, and in many environments
increasingly so. Human populations at the wildland-urban interface increase as residential
developments extend into forest land, and almost a century of ﬁre suppression and exclusion
exacerbate the problem in many places. In fragmented landscapes, escaped prescribed ﬁres
and associated liability are major concern.
The empirical analysis in this article ﬁnds evidence that diﬀerent liability and regulatory
rules aﬀect the number and magnitude of escaped prescribed ﬁres. Ceteris paribus, States
with strict liability rules tend to have fewer private land escaped prescribed ﬁres than states
with a negligence rule, and those that do escape tend to be smaller and inﬂict less damage.
Further, permits and/or burn bans and criminal penalties for negligence tend to reduce the
incidence and extent of escape.
Because state liability law does not directly aﬀect federal employees, however, there
should be no systematic eﬀect of state law on the incidence and severity of escaped pre-
scribed ﬁres started by federal employees. The empirical results presented here are generally
consistent this hypothesis: there is little discernible eﬀect consistent with theory of state lia-
bility law on public employees on federal land. The results do suggest, however, that public
employees on federal land tend to respond to state permit requirements and burn bans, as
well as state criminal liability law.
It is crucial to recognize that these results, which suggest that higher incidence and
severity of escaped prescribed ﬁres occur under less stringent laws, is in no way an indication
that more stringent laws are better. As recognized by a number of statutes in southern
states, prescribed ﬁres can provide public beneﬁts through mitigation of general wildﬁre risk
and other broad-scale vegetation management beneﬁts. It is plausible that the beneﬁts of
increased prescribed ﬁre use outweigh the additional costs of increased prescribed ﬁre at the
22margin. Unfortunately, the datasets used in this analysis do not allow an analysis of these
net beneﬁts. Additional research and data are needed to better understand the tradeoﬀs
associated with prescribed ﬁre use.
23Notes
1This shift in emphasis was not universal phenomenon even in North America. In some
southeastern states — Florida in particular — ﬁre was such a visible and important part
of ecosystems and management practices that prescribed ﬁre was never really abandoned
(Carle 2002).
2Fire suppression may or may not lead to more volatile ﬁre regimes, depending on the
nature of the ecological system in question (Keeley et al. 1999, Minnich 1983).
3ρ > 1 might represent punitive damages.
4To be more speciﬁc, ρ as an index of stringency does diﬀerentiate between diﬀerences
in operations costs wx∗ or expected damage ρd(x∗,z) among the forms of liability, where x∗
represents the chosen level of precaution under a given rule.
5The variance of total aggregate damage is Var[nd(·)ε]=(nd(·))2σ2.
6Recall that the distribution of damage is d(·)ε. Given dε = δπε, the distribution of δε
can be interpreted as the distribution of potential damage across landholdings.
7This is not to say they do not face liability. It is interesting to note, however, that Cleaves
et al. (2000) ﬁnd that for many burn managers in the Federal National Forest System, direct
regulations are often perceived as more of a constraint than liability.
8Rosemary Thomas, ﬁre management oﬃcer for the Bureau of Land Management (rosemary
thomas@blm.gov), and Richard Bahr, Fire Use Specialist for the National Parks Service
(dick bahr@nps.gov concurred in personal communication that federal prescribed ﬁre man-
agers generally do not concern themselves with state liability law when performing prescribed
ﬁres, but generally do abide by permit requirements and burn bans.
249An analysis using pre-aggregated dataset based on NIFMID was developed and presented
in Yoder (2004). The pre-aggregated dataset provides a breakdown of ﬁre information in
terms of general landownership categories for each year up to and state (including those
states not including in NIFMID), but it does not provide information about ownership at
the ﬁre origin, or the category of people who initiated intentional management ignitions.
10Selection of these two samples is based on a set of NIFMID variables: OWNERSHIP ORIGIN
(NIFMID guide table 2.1.4 and 2.2.11), STATISTICAL CAUSE, SPECIFIC CAUSE, and
PEOPLE (NIFMID guide tables 2.2.2). A wildﬁre observation is deﬁned to have been an es-
caped debris ﬁre if STATISTICAL CAUSE = 5, which correspond to ﬁres started for “ﬁeld
burning,” “land clearing,” and “resource management burning,” “trash burning,” “burn-
ing dump,” “slash burning,” and “R/W [right-of-way] burning.” This broad set of burning
activities is included because prescribed ﬁre law is likely to apply to these cases.
11These characteristics correspond to OWNERSHIP ORIGIN = 2 or 3 and PEOPLE =
1, 2, 3, or 5.
12These individuals correspond to OWNERSHIP ORIGIN = 1 or 4 and PEOPLE = 4 or
5.
13One factor that supports the use of both types of costs is that a number of state statutes
explicitly impose liability on individuals for suppression costs if they negligently allow a ﬁre
escape their land.
14One exception to the hypothesized eﬀect of Land value is that if prescribed ﬁre is used to
reduce wildﬁre hazard such that prescribed ﬁre is used more often, it might lead, ironically,
to more escaped prescribed ﬁres.
15Poisson distributions are characterized by an equal mean and variance. Overdispersion
is the case in which the estimated variance is signiﬁcantly larger than the estimated mean.
Negative Binomial regressions are able to allow for overdispersion; A positive and signiﬁcant
25dispersion parameter estimate α indicates overdispersion.
16Van Garderen and Shah (2002) provide an approximation to the exact unbiased estimator
of the variance of the dummy-variable transformation. This approximation was used for
estimating the standard errors reported in this paper. It is worth noting that the delta
method consistently overestimated the variance relative to the ﬁnite-sample approximation
as predicted Van Garderen and Shah (2002).
17Strictly speaking, a PBM law is in eﬀect in Texas, but no burn managers were certiﬁed
in Texas for the time period covered by this sample due to onerous insurance requirements.
18The other legal variables in these regressions are not as consistent as with the larger
samples, however. This is likely due to the fact that there is much less variation among
these variables in this smaller set of states.
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30Figure 1: Histograms of debris ﬁre numbers, damage+suppression, and acreage (left side)
and all other ﬁres (right side). All variables are in natural log form, observations with values
of zero omitted.
31Table 1: State statues for selected prescribed ﬁre laws, 2002
Liability or regulation State
Burner strictly liability CT, ND, NH, OK
statutory Permits or bans AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, ID, IA,
ME, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NH, NJ,
NY, OR, RI, SD, UT, WV, VT, WA
Criminal penalties for unat-
tended ﬁre or negligent escape
AL, AK, CA, MI, NJ, NM, NV, NC,
OK, OR, SC, SD, TN, UT, WI, WY
Prescribed Burn Manager Laws AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC, TXa
aTX has a Certiﬁed Burner law, but no one had been certiﬁed as of 2002, arguably
due to a diﬃcult-to-satisfy insurance requirement. Therefore, Texas is treated as if
it had no Prescribed burn manager (PBM) law.
32Table 2: Summary statistics for variables used in regressions.
Variablea Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
# d. ﬁres 1104 236.198 457.42 0 78
tot. d+s 1104 6078136 305392 0 7760759
tot. ac. 1104 11945.3 59941 0 1004873
avg. d+s 872 10312.0 31777 0 403209
tot. ac. 887 74.6966 881.33 .1 24024
# other ﬁres 1104 5.67934 9.136 0 3074
tot. d+s, oth. ﬁres 1104 35889.3 3.5e+7 0 8.1e+8
tot. acres, oth. ﬁres 1104 144.947 925.5 0 26339.4
avg. d+s, oth. ﬁres 670 5998.44 45114 0 1070221
avg. acres, oth. ﬁres 687 29.9849 120.62 .1 1580.5
strict liability 1104 .093297 .29098 0 1
permits/burn bans 1104 .437 .49630 0 1
criminal penalties 1104 .645833 .47847 0 1
PBM law 1104 .036231 .18695 0 1
PBM gross negligence 1104 .007246 .08485 0 1
total land in state 1104 39.4598 29.663 .669 167.625
federal land acreage 1104 9.56192 14.745 .004 61.548
land value 1104 1051.3 797.85 103.7 4525.17
population density 1104 258.325 364.71 5.34 1809.17
average farm size 1104 687.144 1089.8 83.3 6645.16
state forest acreage 1104 8.38150 6.3437 .305 21.980
state grass acreage 1104 11.2400 18.348 .023 113.45
median patch size 1104 859.833 104.53 590 1000
1970-1985 dummy 1104 .695652 .46033 0 1
aAbbreviated to match table 3:
# d. ﬁres = number of wildﬁres started as ﬁres;
tot. and avg. stand for total and average;

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 4: Elasticity estimates for legal parameters: Public prescribed ﬁres in western states
(USFS regions 1-6), and private contractor ﬁres in southern states (USFS region 8)
Dependent variables → #d.ﬁres ln(tot.d+s) ln(tot.ac.) ln(avg.d+s) ln(avg.ac.)
Fires started on federal land by public employees
Strict liability 0.02 -0.14 -0.66∗∗ 3.03 0.80
Permits/burn bans -0.29∗ 0.27 -0.46 -0.61∗∗ -0.51∗∗
Criminal penalties -0.60∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗
Fires started on private land by contractors
Strict liability -0.33∗ -0.43 -0.56 -0.96∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗
Permits/burn bans 0.52 4.62 2.79 0.84∗∗ 0.30∗∗
Criminal penalties -1.31∗∗∗ -0.40 0.12 0.27 0.19
PBM law -0.16 -0.56∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
PBM gross negligence 0.05∗ 1.87 0.37 -0.10 0.05
35